The report releasted last month documents “intimidation, harassment and persecution” of human rights defenders, along with restrictions on protests and the use of counter-terrorism and digital laws to criminalise dissent. It rates Pakistan’s civic space as “repressed,” the second-worst category, citing a pattern of escalating state controls on expression and assembly.

“Since coming to power, the Shehbaz Sharif government has escalated its repression of activists… silencing critical voices,” said Josef Benedict, an Asia researcher at CIVICUS, calling on authorities to “reverse course” and protect fundamental rights.

The report highlights arrests, legal cases and surveillance targeting prominent activists and lawyers, as well as a broader clampdown on ethnic Baloch and Pashtun movements demanding accountability for enforced disappearances. It also documents increasing use of laws such as the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act to pursue online critics and block digital content.

Journalists have faced mounting pressure, including arrests, investigations and alleged attacks, contributing to what CIVICUS described as a “chilling effect” on media freedom. Protest restrictions have also intensified, with authorities frequently imposing blanket bans and using force to disperse demonstrations, per the report.

The findings come against the backdrop of political tensions following Pakistan’s 2024 elections, which the report says were marked by restrictions on opposition activities and media coverage. Despite these concerns, the country was elected to the UN Human Rights Council for a three-year term earlier this year.

CIVICUS said the situation runs counter to Pakistan’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

News Desk

dissenttoday.net

The post Pakistan’s Civic Freedoms Deteriorate Amid Crackdown on Dissent: Report appeared first on Dissent Today.

The arrests took place in Sector F-6 of the federal capital, where participants had assembled for the rally. Organizers had announced plans to march from F-6 to D-Chowk, a key protest site in the city center. Police briefly blocked nearby roads during the operation, reopening them after the detainees were taken into custody. Veteran human rights activists Tahira Abdullah and Farazana Bari are among those arrested.

The Aurat March X account quoted three journalists who were later released as saying that women were dragged and beaten up by police while being arrested.

District administration officials said the event had not been granted a No Objection Certificate (NOC), which is required to hold public gatherings. They added that Section 144 – a legal provision restricting public assemblies – was in effect in Islamabad at the time. Authorities said the participants were detained for violating these restrictions.

Aurat March organizers, however, said they had submitted an application for an NOC to the deputy commissioner roughly a month earlier and that their request had not been formally rejected.

The arrests drew widespread condemnation.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan said in a post on X: “HRCP demands the immediate release of @Aurat_marchisb organisers and participants, who were arrested earlier today by the Islamabad police. Marking International Women’s Day is the legitimate right of all Pakistani women and must be respected by the authorities. Such oppressive measures in the name of maintaining law and order are highly deplorable.”

Former senator Farhatullah Babar tweeted: “Women activists in front of press club Islamabad arrested without provocation on Int’l Women Day today and sent to women police station. We are at police station for over 2 hours wanting to see them but access is not allowed. Sad, unfortunate. Demand immediate release.”

Former state minister and leader of the Awam Pakistan party, Zafar Mirza, wrote on X: “@AwamPakistan condemn the arrests of the participants of the Aurat March in Islamabad today on the occasion of International Women Day. Peaceful protest is the constitutional and democratic right of every citizen, and actions such as arrests for exercising this right are against democratic values. The government and relevant institutions should respect this fundamental right of citizens and immediately release the arrested persons.

However, Awaam Pakistan also emphasize that all protestors should abide by the law and regulations so that the protest remains peaceful and does not create any kind of unrest or conflict.”

The Aurat March is an annual demonstration held in several Pakistani cities on March 8 to mark International Women’s Day and highlight issues such as gender-based violence, workplace discrimination, and women’s rights.

The rallies have frequently faced pushback from authorities and conservative groups. In 2023, clashes broke out between police and demonstrators during the march in Islamabad, with officers blocking access to protest sites and attempting to disperse participants. In other years, organizers have faced legal petitions seeking to halt the demonstrations, as well as police cases and accusations over slogans and banners displayed during the rallies.

Fariha Ijaz

The writer is an Assistant Editor at Dissent Today, focusing on extremism and political violence.

The post Pakistan Police Arrest 17 at Islamabad Aurat March on Women’s Day appeared first on Dissent Today.

Footage and reports from the scene show leaders of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ –widely understood as the rebranded form of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) – delivering hard-line speeches in the afternoon just before the blast. The event included rhetoric targeting Shia beliefs and identity. While the rally itself did not turn violent, its timing and message have intensified scrutiny of the sectarian undercurrents that afflict Pakistan.

Who Are ASWJ/SSP?

ASWJ traces its roots directly to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a Sunni extremist organization founded in the 1980s with an explicitly anti-Shia agenda. SSP was outlawed in 2002, but has continually resurfaced under new names, including ASWJ, allowing its activists and leaders to operate in public political and religious spaces.

Human rights reports and country analyses also document widespread incitement of hatred and violence against Shia Muslims by extremist clerics and groups in Pakistan, with rhetoric tolerated across many regions even when overt violence declines.

A history of anti-Shia violence

Shia Muslims – a minority in predominantly Sunni Pakistan – have been recurrent targets of sectarian violence over decades. Studies and historical records show thousands of Shias killed in militant attacks by groups that include violent offshoots of Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Islamic State affiliates. These groups have on several occasions vowed to “rid Pakistan of Shias.”

Notable historical instances include the 1963 Therhi massacre in Sindh, where more than a hundred Shias were killed in a sectarian attack, and the 1988 Gilgit massacre, in which estimates place Shia fatalities in the hundreds amid targeted violence. Mass bombings in Quetta’s Shia-dominated neighborhoods and targeted killings also claimed hundreds of lives from 2010-2013.

More recently, a mass shooting ambush on a convoy of Shia travellers in Kurram District in late 2024 killed at least 54 people — one of the deadliest sectarian assaults in years.

These attacks are part of a long pattern of sectarian militancy in Pakistan, where extremist groups have periodically targeted Shias during worship, pilgrimage or travel.

Pakistan blames the “foreign hand”

In the aftermath of Friday’s Islamabad blast, Pakistani authorities have placed strong emphasis on foreign involvement in the attack.

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi said investigators had identified suspects with links to militants in Afghanistan and alleged support from foreign actors, including India – claims that Indian officials have called “baseless and pointless.”

The Islamic State’s Pakistan affiliate has also claimed responsibility for the bombing, underscoring the role of transnational extremist networks in attacking Shia targets.

However, critics argue that focusing on external blame may obscure the deep-rooted history of sectarian hatred and organized anti-Shia activity inside Pakistan, including groups like ASWJ/SSP whose rhetoric and mobilisation have helped normalise social hostility toward religious minorities.

Civil society advocates warn that without confronting these internal dynamics – including public hate speech and the continued operation of sectarian networks – Pakistan’s recurring cycles of violence against Shias will persist alongside any foreign threats.

Fariha Ijaz

The writer is an Assistant Editor at Dissent Today, focusing on extremism and political violence.

The post Overlooking Homegrown Hate, Pakistan Hesitates to Call Islamabad Blast Anti-Shia Violence appeared first on Dissent Today.

The convictions against the husband-wife duo stem from tweets about enforced disappearances and other human rights concerns posted by Imaan and reposted by Hadi.

For these X posts, both have been convicted under various sections of the cybercrime law. However, the order does not clarify whether the sentences are to be served consecutively, amounting to a total of 17 years, or concurrently, which would cap the jail term at 10 years — the maximum sentence imposed under any single section.

Ten years ago, in 2016, when the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act was passed under the Pakistan Muslim League – N (PML-N) government, it was widely criticized as a tool to suppress dissent. In the years since, vague call-up notices and First Information Reports (FIRs) against political workers, journalists, and dissidents have become routine. The accusations almost always involve posting “anti-state” content.

Originally enacted under the PML-N government, PECA was later turned against PML-N workers and leaders after their term ended in 2018. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) attempted to further strengthen the law through controversial amendments and ordinances during its tenure from 2018 to 2022, though these moves did not survive judicial scrutiny.

“While the common complaint about Pakistan’s criminal justice system is endless delays, Imaan and Hadi’s trial was unusually swift — though far from fair.”

A constant criticism of PECA is that the process itself serves as punishment: individuals are charged and then subjected to the grueling criminal trial process, which becomes punitive in its own right. Arrests, bail hearings, repeated court appearances, the stigma of being labeled “anti-state,” and the constant threat of a lingering case – often without trial – have been the typical pattern under PECA. This ordeal itself seemed to be the goal, rather than securing convictions. That changed with Imaan and Hadi’s case, which proceeded with unusual swiftness.

Among other provisions, they were sentenced under the latest amendment to PECA, called Section 26-A, which was introduced after a rushed and controversial process just last year by the current ruling coalition. The amendment was pushed through the Parliament without meaningful debate and was deployed almost immediately against journalists less than two months after its passage. Imaan and Hadi had defended some of these journalists as counsel. Ironically, theirs is the first conviction under PECA’s latest amendment. Their only “crime” was refusing to acquiesce. This refusal is precisely what they have been punished for.

While the common complaint about Pakistan’s criminal justice system is endless delays, Imaan and Hadi’s trial was unusually swift — though far from fair. The cybercrime case against them was registered last August, and the trial concluded within five months. This trial can only be described as a mistrial, since they were sentenced in absentia. While on their way to appear before the trial court (after receiving protection from the High Court), they were violently arrested in connection with another case. A fresh, previously unknown FIR – dating back to February – was suddenly invoked against the couple, of which neither they nor anyone else had prior knowledge. They were stopped in the middle of the road, violently arrested, and secretly produced before the Anti-Terrorism Court without informing their family or legal counsel.

They were arrested on Jan. 23, and sent to Adiala Jail. The High Court had given them until Jan. 24 to join the trial court proceedings and complete the cross examination of prosecution witnesses. Had they not been arrested, they would have done so. But since they were intercepted on their way to court, then put in jail, they were made to join court proceedings in the PECA trial via video link from prison. They were told to complete their cross-examination remotely rather than in person — of course without access to any case files or ability to confront witnesses with material. Just because someone is placed under arrest in one case does not mean they forgo the right to appear in court to defend themselves in another case registered against them. Both protested how they were being dealt with, boycotting the proceedings. Hours later, they were convicted.

Laws like PECA, which excessively criminalize speech, are merely instruments of control. Compounded by a regressive and overbroad statute is a criminal justice system that many human rights advocates call a “criminal injustice” system, wielded by the state to target dissidents like Imaan and Hadi.

As seen in their case, complaints often originate from within the investigating agency itself: the case was built by an officer of the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA). In most such cases, a technical assistant from the agency serves as the complainant or informant, monitoring and flagging posts. What is particularly absurd about their case is that the “incriminating” posts reflect positions long and publicly held by a wide range of human rights activists – including many now in government when they were in opposition. These concern the rights of political prisoners wrongly incarcerated by the state, the practice of enforced disappearances, the plight of affected families, and broader state policy on militancy.

When Imaan and Hadi cross-examined NCCIA officers, it became evident how quickly the case unraveled on its merits. But that was precisely what was not allowed. Not once but twice, their right to cross-examination was denied. They had to approach the High Court and Supreme Court to have it restored.

When they did get that right, they were hit with fresh cases and ultimately jailed in one and sentenced in another. The judgment itself makes no mention of the cross-examination that occurred, as though it never happened.

Two human rights lawyers who have defended others against the state’s excesses and advocated for the wrongfully incarcerated now face the same treatment themselves. It is now up to others to advocate for their rights, because if this can happen to them, it can happen to anyone.

Farieha Aziz

The writer is a co-founder of Bolo Bhi, an advocacy forum for digital rights and host of the Digi Pod on Dawn News English

The post How Imaan-Hadi Conviction Marks the Death of Fair Trial in Pakistan appeared first on Dissent Today.

Islamabad – Shafiullah Jan, special assistant to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) chief minister, appeared to refuse to categorically label the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) a “terrorist organization” in an interview with a national news anchor last week – drawing sharp criticism from opponents, activists and media commentators.

At a press appearance this week, federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar played a video clip in which Jan was asked whether the outlawed TTP is a terrorist group. Jan declined to give an unequivocal “yes,” saying “there are groups within the TTP and those who are against the state are terrorists.”

The federal minister seized on the remarks, accusing Jan and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) of soft-pedaling Pakistan’s insurgent threat and extended an “olive branch” to militants.

“The spokespersons of the political party are afraid of talking about the terrorist group,” Tarar said, claiming that PTI leaders fear being attacked by the TTP and therefore won’t condemn them outright.

The comments reignited long-standing debates in Pakistan about counterterrorism, messaging and political strategy — and drawn fire on social media from journalists and activists.

“Inexcusable behavior. You cannot complain or clutch pearls about being smeared as terror sympathizers when your own government’s spokesman can’t muster the bare bones clarity or spine to call the mass murdering butchers of TTP a terrorist group,” wrote activist Ammar Rashid on X.

Raza Haroon, a former provincial minister, wrote: “#PTI appears visibly confused and lacking clarity. Today, the party’s Secretary General, @salmanAraja, categorically acknowledged the #TTP as a terrorist organisation, ironically on the same show..”, adding, “This only exposes the party’s persistent policy incoherence and internal contradictions.”

Some commentators also mentioned older controversies around incarcerated former premier Imran Khan’s statements on militant figures.

In June 2020, Khan drew international and domestic rebuke when he used the Urdu word “shaheed” (martyr) to describe slain Osama bin Laden during a National Assembly speech – language critics said blurred the line between strategic critique of U.S. foreign policy and reverence for a globally designated terrorist.

Opposition leaders at the time said bin Laden was “a terrorist through and through,” pointing to the attacks he orchestrated at home and abroad, including against Pakistani citizens, and questioning the prime minister’s choice of words.

The TTP has been proscribed in Pakistan for years and is widely accused of orchestrating deadly attacks across the country, particularly in the north-west.

Against that backdrop, critics argue that any ambiguity in public rhetoric undermines counterterrorism efforts and emboldens extremist narratives.

Political rhetoric that fails to clearly denounce militant groups like the TTP is problematic because it dilutes public understanding of the threat the group poses and weakens a unified national response to ongoing violence, including numerous recent attacks the TTP has carried out in Pakistan.

Ambiguous language from political figures, especially when they avoid plainly calling an active militant group a terrorist organization, can create confusion among citizens about who is a threat and why, making it harder to sustain broad support for the hard security and legal measures needed to counter the challenge, especially given that there has been a resurgence of the TTP threat recently.

Analysts and security experts have noted that shifting or evasive narratives around the TTP have left the Pakistani public “poorly informed and confused about the nature of the threat,” and have at times emboldened the insurgents by suggesting there might be political space for negotiation without accountability, a distinction crucial for effective counterterrorism policy and public resilience.

This ambiguity also has real implications for national cohesion and counterterror strategy. When elected officials hedge on defining terrorism, it can erode confidence in government commitment to security policy, weaken cross-party cooperation on counterterrorism, and even be exploited by militants in their propaganda, which actively seeks to shape narratives in their favor.

Such rhetoric risks normalizing extremist violence in public discourse and undermines long-standing frameworks like Pakistan’s National Action Plan, which was built on broad consensus to crack down on terrorism and eliminate proscribed organizations.

Fariha Ijaz

The writer is an Assistant Editor at Dissent Today, focusing on extremism and political violence.

The post PTI’s Ambiguous Rhetoric on Taliban Is Dangerous for Pakistan’s Counter-Extremism Efforts appeared first on Dissent Today.

When a supposed National Cyber Crime Agency (NCCIA) official witness, who could not even produce a valid NCCIA identification card, is cross-examined in this alleged cybercrime case and declares that using the term “enforced disappearance” in a tweet amounts to propagating a terrorist narrative, the farce underlying both the First Information Report (FIR) and the trial stands fully exposed.

The absurdity deepens when it is pointed out that the very same term has been used repeatedly by Pakistan’s Supreme Court, the Islamabad High Court, and other high courts; by politicians, including the current chief minister of Punjab, Maryam Nawaz Sharif; and that Pakistan itself has an official Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances. Yet the witness insists that when others use the term, it does not constitute terrorist propaganda, but when the accused uses it in this particular trial, even in a similar legal and factual context, it suddenly does.

This contradiction lays bare not only the falsehood underpinning the prosecution but also its mala fide intent. It shows how, in today’s Pakistan, words are being weaponized – stripped of their legal meaning and context – to silence human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and all those who question or criticize the policies and actions of the state and its institutions.

Take the term “enforced disappearance.” The NCCIA would do well to educate itself. Enforced disappearance is not a political slogan; it is a well-established concept in international law and international relations, particularly since the aftermath of the Second World War.

The first documented instance of systematic enforced disappearances occurred during WWII, when Nazi Germany covertly abducted thousands of people from occupied territories under the infamous 1941 Nacht und Nebel Erlass – the Night and Fog Decree.

The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal addressed this policy directly. Its judgments relating to the Night and Fog decree constituted the first application of international law to enforced disappearances. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, who was responsible for implementing the decree, was tried and executed for his role. As legal scholars have noted, the Nuremberg judgments established that conduct underlying enforced disappearance was prohibited under the customary laws of war and constituted a war crime carrying individual criminal liability (Brian Finucane, “Enforced Disappearance as a Crime Under International Law: A Neglected Origin in the Laws of War,” Yale Journal of International Law, 2010). These judgments also underscored that enforced disappearance amounts to a crime against humanity, not merely a war crime.

Against this backdrop, how can the government of Pakistan justify filing a cybercrime case against an individual simply for using the term “enforced disappearance,” accusing them of furthering a terrorist narrative?

The argument that referencing enforced disappearances necessarily accuses the state, law enforcement agencies, or intelligence services is also legally untenable. International law has always defined enforced disappearance within these parameters.

“In today’s Pakistan, words are being weaponized – stripped of their legal meaning and context – to silence human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and all those who question or criticize the policies and actions of the state and its institutions.”

 

A clear distinction exists between kidnapping by non-state actors and enforced disappearance. Kidnapping is an unlawful seizure carried out by individuals and is addressed under ordinary criminal law. Enforced disappearance, by contrast, involves the arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by state agents, or by non-state actors acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention or concealment of the person’s fate or whereabouts.

This places the individual outside the protection of the law, making enforced disappearance not only a crime but a grave human rights violation.

This distinction is reflected consistently in United Nations’ resolutions and in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED). Pakistan’s position further undermines the NCCIA’s claims because the country did not oppose two key UN General Assembly resolutions on enforced disappearances: Resolution 33/173 in December 1978 and Resolution 47/133 in December 1992. Both were adopted unanimously.

The 1978 resolution expressed deep concern over reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances resulting from excesses by law enforcement or security authorities and called on states to hold perpetrators accountable and assist in locating the disappeared. It also urged UN bodies to take action to prevent such practices. The 1992 resolution adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and paved the way for the ICPPED.

Although Pakistan is not a party to the Convention, its definitions reflect the consensus expressed in those earlier, unanimously adopted resolutions.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court has itself relied on the same definition, including in the Mohabbat Shah case. Article 1(2) of the ICPPED states that no exceptional circumstances — whether war, political instability, or public emergency — may be invoked to justify enforced disappearance. Article 2 defines enforced disappearance as the deprivation of liberty by state agents or those acting with state acquiescence, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention or concealment of the person’s fate.

Enforced disappearances are not unique to Pakistan. They have occurred across the world — from Latin America to Asia and Africa — particularly during the Cold War era. The Indian state, for instance, has been implicated in enforced disappearances in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir since 1989, as well as in Punjab and Manipur during the 1980s and 1990s.

In many Latin American countries, the end of military dictatorships and the restoration of democracy led to the cessation of enforced disappearances and, in some cases, accountability for past crimes.

In Pakistan, however, impunity continues to prevail, despite our international commitments against enforced disappearance.

Recently, Pakistan’s military spokesman Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry held a prejudicial and inflammatory press conference and commented on the subject matter of Imaan and Hadi’s ongoing trial. It reveals the real origin of the case, making it clear that it is no longer possible for any court in Pakistan to adjudicate upon the matter in a fair and unbiased manner.

This trial is about whether Pakistan will uphold the rule of law, respect international legal norms, and protect the fundamental right to speak the truth.

Shireen Mazari

The writer is a defense and security analyst and served as Pakistan’s Minister for Human Rights from 2018 to 2022.

The post How My Daughter’s Trial Exposes Pakistan’s Assault on Human Rights appeared first on Dissent Today.

ISLAMABAD – Militants in Pakistan’s volatile Waziristan region have escalated attacks on educational institutions just days before the end of 2025.

On Thursday, unidentified assailants detonated explosives at the Government Primary School in the Khushhali area of Ayaz Kot village in North Waziristan. According to reports, the attack obliterated much of the building and left more than 600 students without a classroom.

No group has claimed responsibility so far.

The attack follows a broader pattern of violence in the former tribal district, where armed groups have targeted schools amid a rise in terror attacks.

In December of last year, the United Nations special rapporteurs wrote a letter to the government of Pakistan, voicing their concerns over militant assaults on girls’ schools in the country.

In the letter, Farida Shaheed, special rapporteur on the right to education; Reem Alsalem, special rapporteur on violence against women and girls; and Laura Nyirinkindi, chair-rapporteur of the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, called on the government of Pakistan to protect the fundamental right of women and girls to receive a safe and secure education.

“We are troubled by the persistent terrorist attacks targeting girls’ schools by groups opposing the education of women and girls. While all attacks on schools are reprehensible, those specifically aimed at girls’ institutions discourage women and girls from pursuing education, thereby reinforcing discrimination and societal inequalities,” the letter read.

Further, they requested information from the government regarding the investigations and actions being taken to safeguard girls’ schools in Waziristan.

Militants have bombed or burned girls’ schools in both North and South Waziristan, often citing opposition to female education.

Parents and rights advocates say the latest school bombing undermines efforts to expand schooling in a region where access to education, especially for girls, remains limited.

“This school was the only beacon of hope for our children,” one local elder was quoted as saying by Dawn, lamenting how the blast threatens young students’ futures.

Security challenges persist across Pakistan’s northwest, with Pakistani forces conducting counter-terror operations even as violence affects civilian life.

The rise in school attacks adds to mounting concerns about safety and the ability of the state to protect basic services in former conflict zones. Observers note that attacks on schools resonate widely in Pakistan, evoking memories of past high-profile assaults on educational institutions by extremists.

Fariha Ijaz

The writer is an Assistant Editor at Dissent Today, focusing on extremism and political violence.

The post 600 Students Affected As Blast Destroys Government School in Waziristan appeared first on Dissent Today.

Tirah Valley, Pakistan – After three months of fighting for her life, five-year-old Aliya died on October 8 — the innocent casualty of a summer drone strike that shattered her quiet village in Pakistan’s troubled Tirah Valley. She was the youngest of six children of Adnan, a 35-year-old tractor driver.

On July 19, she and a group of children were playing in the sunshine when the drone strike took place. A single shot to her head left her unconscious and paralyzed, and several classmates wounded.

Since that day, Adnan poured 800,000 PKR (about $2830) into medical care, sinking deeper into debt without even fully knowing the sum.

“I don’t know how much more I will spend on my child,” he had told Dissent Today just days before his daughter’s death.

Until the very end, Adnan clung to hope. “Even if no one helps us, I want to see my daughter walk and smile again,” he said.

“I will do whatever I can so she can play and talk with us like before.”

But in the end, that hope slipped away.

The drone strike that killed Aliya in a small town in Pakistan’s restive northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province was part of Islamabad’s fresh counter-terrorism strategy under Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (literally, “Resolve for Stability”).

Launched in June 2024, this reinvigorated campaign includes frequent use of drone strikes – including both high-altitude drones and quad-copters — to carry out intelligence-led, precision strikes in the country’s border regions.

But drone warfare is not new here.

Since the early 2000s, the United States has carried out hundreds of drone strikes targeting militants, especially in the then-Federally Administered Tribal Areas (now merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), often provoking debates about civilian harm and accountability.

The strikes, directed under various command structures including the CIA, left deep scars.

The first known drone strike in Pakistan took place on June 19, 2004. Over time, what began as periodic covert operations escalated into a prolonged campaign. Between the Bush and the first Trump presidencies, at least 414 strikes were documented, mostly under former U.S. President Barack Obama. Estimates place civilian deaths and injuries between 2,366 and 3,702.

Now, a new wave of drone strikes is once again claiming civilian lives — this time carried out not by the U.S., but by the Pakistani military, with little public debate.

Last Saturday, less than two months after Aliya’s death, another drone — a quadcopter — struck a wedding ceremony in the same Tirah Valley, injuring eight people, including children.

Lawmakers in Pakistan’s National Assembly strongly condemned the latest strike. Voices from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan called the drone attack an “insult” to the province and demanded a commission to investigate.

Human rights groups say the strikes, increasingly carried out using quadcopter and other UAVs, have killed scores of civilians.

In June, Amnesty International reported that at least 17 civilians, including five children, have died in these operations in 2025. Local protests erupted after a suspected quadcopter attack in South Waziristan killed a child and wounded others that month.

According to reports, both the military and militant groups are carrying out these strikes. The devices are used either for surgical, short-range attacks or to drop explosives on specific targets. Unlike earlier campaigns, the newer strikes are frequently occurring closer to densely populated civilian areas.

Local human rights activist Alamzeb Mahsood, who has been documenting these attacks, told Dissent Today that most civilian casualties result from military operations. He explained that militant groups usually know their own targets, but the military often struggles to locate them precisely — a failure that leads to the deaths of civilians, including women and children.

On the morning of October 23, a man and his daughter lost their lives in what appeared to be a quadcopter drone attack.

Earlier, on September 22, more than 20 civilians, including women and children, were killed in Tirah when bombs allegedly dropped by aircraft struck residential neighborhoods.

Security sources claimed the blast came from militants’ own stockpiles. However, local leaders and activists insisted it was a strike on unarmed civilians.

Then-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur responded with a compensation announcement of ₨10 million to each victim’s family, calling the deaths “regrettable and condemnable.”

Mahsood has documented around 45 drone strikes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2025, many of which were initially denied by authorities and only acknowledged — often with compensation for affected families — once independent proof emerged.

He notes that many more strikes likely go unreported, especially in remote districts like Waziristan, Bajaur, Bannu, and Khyber, because these areas are difficult to access.

According to residents interviewed by Dissent Today, there was no warning before many of these strikes — they came without notice and hit civilians, including women and children.

A senior security official, speaking anonymously, argued that local resistance complicates matters: militant groups often use homes in targeted areas as shelter, making precise operations difficult and raising the risk to civilians.

Lives Shattered, Homes Abandoned

Shamshad Khan, 23, lives in Loi Mamund, Bajaur. On August 30, he was injured in a drone strike — he lost the use of one leg. His younger sister was also wounded; she now suffers from frequent headaches.

The family fled immediately, despite previous military assurances their home was safe. Local elders had asked authorities about safety in advance, and were told they had nothing to fear.

“There are moments when I think, why did we trust them?” Khan says. There was no official aid. To reach medical help, he was carried by neighbors to a road with no vehicles, then transported by bicycle to where help was available.

The Psychological Cost

Far beyond the physical injuries, survivors describe a haunting toll: fear, nightmares, anxiety, a sense that safety is a lie.

12‑year‑old Ishaal from Kambar Khel in Tirah Valley is among them. A drone struck her home; she and other family members were wounded.

“I used to dream the Taliban were coming and killing us,” she told Dissent Today. Her mother would wake her, hold her, and tell her she was safe. But the fear remains, rooted in her sleep and waking hours alike.

No precise government statistics track these new drone and quadcopter strikes. Local authorities say they lack comprehensive data, making accountability difficult.

The Counter‑Terrorism Department, when pressed, confirmed to Dissent Today that they do not maintain exact numbers for many of the incidents.

Without clarity, victims are left without recourse.

After last week’s strike, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leaders, who head the provincial government, warned that any civilian casualties would be unacceptable — and threatened to file a case against the federal government if no militants were proven to have been present during the strike.

Back in Bar Qambar Khel, in the heart of Tirah Valley, Aliya’s father now lives under a heavy shadow of grief — his suffering, and that of countless other families, is still ignored by Pakistan’s mainstream politicians and media.

Jamaima Afridi

The writer is a freelance journalist based in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. She writes about women’s rights, religious freedom, climate change, refugees, and human rights issues across Pakistan, specifically in conflict zones.

The post Unseen Victims: How Pakistan’s Drone War is Haunting Tirah Valley appeared first on Dissent Today.

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province by land, bordering Afghanistan and Iran. It is rich in minerals and resources, but it has long suffered from poverty, underdevelopment, and weak political representation. 

Despite its strategic importance and its contributions, the voices of ordinary Baloch citizens are rarely heard in national debates.

Over the last year, Balochistan has been racked by escalating violence and systematic suppression of dissent. The arrests of leaders human rights activists like Dr. Mahrang Baloch and others connected with their group, Baloch Yakjehti Committee, reflect a government approach that favors coercion over conversation.

Several recent assassination attempts make this clear. In March of this year, my father, Sardar Akhtar Mengal, narrowly escaped a suicide bombing near a rally he was leading from Wadh to the capital, Quetta, in a mountainous district called Mastung. 

On September 2, in Quetta, a bomb exploded in the parking area after a memorial gathering for my grandfather, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, killing at least eleven people and injuring many more just as the event was ending. It was obvious the gathering itself was the target.

These attacks are meant to send a warning that political expression is allowed only on the state’s terms. Weeks have passed without serious inquiry or accountability. When Balochistan has no electoral impact, its concerns vanish from the spotlight. Its political space has shrunk through arrests, harassment, and threats. Once this void forms, restoring trust becomes extremely difficult.

Despite large budgets allocated for “security,” protection of lives does not follow. I remember watching news of disasters like the Jaffarabad Express tragedy and the casualties at my grandfather’s death anniversary. The urgency, which should come with such loss of life, was missing.

National politics treats Balochistan only as a bargaining chip — when votes are needed to pass controversial legislation or to form coalitions. But increasingly, even that limited influence is slipping, as handpicked representatives dominate assemblies and legislation passes without meaningful negotiation.

On the international stage, Balochistan is often framed as a place of resource opportunity — where mining, oil, gas, and ports matter for foreign investors. But the disparity between those economic narratives and the lived reality is stark. Communities remain underdeveloped, suffer human rights abuses, and see little benefit from the projects supposed to lift them.

There is also a trend of simplifying Baloch grievances into accusations of “foreign interference,” allowing governments to avoid real accountability. Meanwhile, people inside Pakistan who oppose or criticize repressive policies are punished or ignored. Opposition parties speak loudly about Baloch issues only when they are out of power. Once in power, they often fall silent, offering phrases like “we were constrained, what can we do?” — which only deepen the sense that suffering is rhetorical, not real.

To break this cycle, meaningful change is essential.

• End arbitrary arrests. Let political activists and human rights defenders work without fear.
• Create a credible, independent truth and reconciliation commission to address enforced disappearances and abuse.
• Ensure that local communities have a genuine say in decisions about resource extraction and development, so that they see benefits themselves.
• Shift from militarized security toward civilian governance, especially in cities where political expression must be protected.
• Invest in education, entrepreneurship, and civic engagement so young people see that politics can be a path to change — not a dead end.

This moment is dangerous but not irreversible. If the state does not act, the gulf of disillusionment will grow. If voices are silenced, unrest will grow. Dialogue, inclusion, and justice remain our only way forward.

Amid violence and unrest, Balochistan’s youth are waiting for reasons to believe in politics again. The responsibility now rests with those in power to offer those reasons before trust is lost permanently. It may feel like time has run out, but it is not yet over.

Banari Mengal

The writer is the co-founder of the NGO BYAC, which focuses on advocacy and community initiatives in Balochistan, Pakistan.

The post Why Balochistan’s Youth No Longer Trust Politics appeared first on Dissent Today.

“Will anyone come? We have been waiting for so many days,” asked a Baloch mother, grasping my hand in hope of good news. Another mother, Zar Gul, whose son Saeed Ahmed was forcibly disappeared in 2013, joined in, holding my other hand and saying, “Maybe this time we’ll bring our sons home.”

These past fifty-plus days in Islamabad have been an emotional whirlwind for anyone visiting the Baloch families’ camp near the National Press Club in F‑6 sector. The women’s stories are so harrowing that they often collapse while recounting their ordeal — seeing their sons abducted by plainclothes men who broke into their homes; enduring ten years of agonizing waiting, searching for answers in courts and on the streets; holding fifteen years of hope that their brothers remain alive as they were when taken before their eyes.

The Baloch National Movement’s human rights department, Paank, reported that in the first half of 2025 alone, 785 cases of enforced disappearances and 121 extrajudicial killings were documented.

The Defence of Human Rights has documented 3,140 cases since 2006, with 1,362 victims still missing. In 2025, 32 new cases were reported.

Only the families enduring this cruel, collective, and relentless punishment truly understand what each second of the day feels like. Their cries seem to go unheard in the corridors of power just streets away — no government minister has visited the camp to date. This government’s apathy is so stark and the war on its citizens so brazen that even the fiction of engagement with these elderly women and young girls has been abandoned.

The callousness is further illustrated by the authorities’ refusal to allow the peaceful protesters to set up camp for shelter outside the Press Club. Much like they are caged in Balochistan, these women are now confined to a narrow road, surrounded by barriers and barbed wire — a chilling reminder of that treatment during the 2023 Baloch long march to Islamabad.

During the freezing winter of 2023, many of them were attacked with water cannons and sticks as they peacefully protested. Many, including young Mahzaib (niece of forcibly disappeared Rashid Hussain), were unlawfully arrested, detained, and loaded into buses to be forcibly sent back to Balochistan.

Although the Baloch Yekjehti Committee has made significant strides in advocating for human rights, its impact has been severely hampered by the detention of its leadership, most notably Dr. Mahrang Baloch, its founder and a globally recognized human rights activist.

Dr. Baloch has now been detained since March 22, following a peaceful sit-in protesting state violence.

Her imprisonment has deeply affected the community. Elderly mothers at the protest camp have shown me photographs of their sons and said, “Mahrang raised her voice for them. Now, we will raise our voice for Mahrang.”

Moreover, almost the entire leadership of the Committee is now behind bars. This includes Sebghetullah Shah Jee, Beebarg Baloch, Beebow Baloch, and Gulzadi Baloch.

The legal process surrounding these detentions reflects a persistent pattern of arbitrary and prolonged incarceration. The authorities have repeatedly invoked the colonial-era Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) law — originally enacted in 1960 — allowing detention without formal charges. Even when the judicial system convenes hearings, the prosecution repeatedly fails to present credible evidence, yet the detainees remain imprisoned.

These women and girls are not just here for their loved ones – they are here to demand the release of those brave leaders who carried the grief of the Baloch people on their shoulders. They remember the Long March with Dr. Mahrang to Islamabad in 2023.

Though the state succeeded in breaking the hope of many — as seen in the much smaller number who returned this year — even the stubborn hope held by these few women sends a powerful message to the people of Pakistan: no matter how heartless the state’s response, the path of peaceful resistance must not be abandoned.

Passersby often approach the camp and ask, “Why have they been sitting here so long? Has anyone from the government come to speak to them yet?” When told that no one has come despite more than a month of protest, through scorching heat and torrential downpour, they merely sigh and move on. But these women cannot move forward, as their lives remain forever suspended.

There is no doubt that enforced disappearances are Pakistan’s greatest crisis — the clearest indication of a total breakdown in rule of law in a society that tolerates this atrocity. Impunity is entrenched: not a single perpetrator has been identified or brought to justice.

Worse still, impunity has grown in recent months, especially since the 26th Constitutional Amendment. 

Baloch families have always faced significant challenges in registering cases for crimes committed against them. But following recent amendments, police have begun to outright refuse the registration of abduction First Information Reports (FIRs) — even when the Islamabad High Court is actively hearing a habeas corpus petition or has issued a court order.

Habeas corpus petitions, which were once heard promptly — often the same or next day — are now delayed due to frivolous administrative objections, even when hearings are scheduled. New judges at the Islamabad High Court have started to decline directing police to register abduction FIRs immediately, even in cases where previous court interventions had led to the recovery of missing persons, as in the Ahmad Farhad case.

The state has given its people nothing to hope for. Yet against all odds, these courageous mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives still find hope. They refuse to give up. Their loved ones may be missing, but they will not be forgotten. 

The state must remember: this pain cannot be erased, and the peaceful struggle against enforced disappearances cannot be ignored — doing so risks irreparable damage to the integrity of the federation.

Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir

The writer is an Islamabad-based lawyer and human rights activist.

The post In Islamabad, State’s Apathy on Full Display as Baloch Families Hold Protest Camp appeared first on Dissent Today.