This article is part of a series titled “Is there a way forward for Pakistan?” Read more about the series here.
The recent debate on “re-imagining Pakistan” has once again turned a spotlight, among others, on the long-running conflict in Balochistan. The Baloch ethno-nationalist movement remains the most intractable challenge to national integration. It has been marked by on-again-off-again resort to armed struggle alternated with phases of non-violent political struggle. The latest wave of conflict is the longest and most complex in form and nature.
Overview of the conflict landscape:
While the ongoing conflict has intermittently generated debate in mainstream media, it is focused on symptoms, rather than systemic drivers of the conflict. It is imperative to first map the conflict landscape, analyse and identify the systemic drivers of under-development and conflict and then explore potential solutions that can help the region break out of the poverty and conflict trap.
To begin with, it is worth emphasising that the conflict landscape in Balochistan has become increasingly complex over the years. On the one hand, there is a low-scale ethnic insurgency concentrated mainly in southern Balochistan. On the other hand, sectarian and religious militancy in northern and central Balochistan continue to pose a threat to peace and stability. Over the past decade, the Islamic State has also established a footprint in the province and built alliances with sectarian groups and splinter groups of TTP. The latter is responsible for some of the most deadly attacks carried out in the province in the last few years. The biggest systemic drivers of religious and sectarian militancy include a pro-Taliban Afghan policy, a double-faced national security policy, existence of a vast madrassah infrastructure, and presence of bigotry and hate content in educational curricula.
The Baloch ethnic conflict is significantly different in nature from the sectarian and religious militancy. While both involve ideational motives, the latter seeks to implement by coercive means a reactionary and retrogressive interpretation of religion against the will of the majority, whereas the former is striving for carving an autonomous political entity out of the existing political system, which they view as an incorrigibly authoritarian and majoritarian state dominated by the Punjabi elites. Unlike religious militancy, the Baloch ethnic conflict is fuelled by a popularly-held, genuine grievance about a history of brutal use of force and exploitation of natural resources by the State.
From an institutional perspective, the Baloch ethno-nationalist conflict is mainly a reaction to Pakistan’s authoritarian political system, centralized and majoritarian federal structure and an exclusivist approach to nation-building.
While the role of centralization of powers, authoritarianism and flawed approach to nation-building are widely acknowledged in academic debate on ethnic tensions in Pakistan, the role of majoritarian federal design is seldom understood.
Pakistan’s current majoritarian federal design makes Balochistan the least rewarding political constituency for political parties aspiring to come to power at the federal level. It offers little to no incentive to these parties to care about the province. This primarily explains why successive governments in Islamabad have tended to remain indifferent about Balochistan. Moreover, the Senate and Council of Common Interests (CCI), the supposedly majority-constraining institutions, have been ineffective in enabling smaller provinces like Balochistan to block policies or legislations that may impinge upon their rights.
Way forward:
The restoration of durable peace in the province requires a holistic but differentiated strategy.
Tackling religious and sectarian militancy requires a fundamental shift in our national security policy and Afghan policy. Externally, the decades-old pro-Taliban Afghan policy needs to be reviewed and revised in favour of a more balanced and progressive policy.
Taliban are unlikely to ensure sustained peace and stable political order in Afghanistan. Our security thinkers need to appreciate that the resurgence of TTP is, and shall remain, an inevitable outcome of ascendance to power of the Taliban in Kabul. With the Taliban in power in Kabul, durable peace is unlikely to be established in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, at the domestic front, it is high time to adopt a policy of zero tolerance and indiscriminate action against sectarian and religious militant outfits.
The Baloch ethnic conflict merits a different strategy. The key takeaway from the nearly 19-year-long insurgency is that repressive measures and cosmetic development packages have both failed to bring the disaffected Baloch into the political mainstream. There is no denying that hard and kinetic measures have succeeded in temporarily curbing the intensity of the Baloch insurgency. However, the persistence and resurgence of violent conflict proves that a security-centric approach alone cannot deliver peace. Here is what the government needs to do to find a sustainable solution to the Baloch conflict:
First, the government should prepare a comprehensive strategy for reaching out to Baloch insurgents. This strategy should entail the engagement of credible political voices to lead negotiations, offer substantial concessions and implement confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as stopping military operations, withdrawing the FC from certain areas, releasing all Baloch missing persons and compensating the families of those killed extra-judicially. Mere offers of amnesty or exhortations to abandon violence won’t work.
Pakistan’s current majoritarian federal design makes Balochistan the least rewarding political constituency for political parties aspiring to come to power at the federal level. It offers little to no incentive to these parties to care about the province.
The military establishment’s support is a must for the proposed reconciliation efforts to make headway. The military needs to appreciate that a hard approach alone will ensure only temporary peace at best and that a low-level insurgency can continue almost indefinitely no matter what security measures are taken. The low-level violence is enough to put the state on the defensive, draw international attention and unsettle foreign investors. Previous efforts to reconcile Baloch insurgents failed because, 1) ) repression went hand in hand with reconciliation efforts, and 2) those leading the process had little credibility or freedom to make meaningful offers.
Moreover, the state should also be willing to abandon patronage of the cadre of artificial leaders it has propped up over the decades, notably tribal sardars. These people are the main beneficiaries of the conflict and, therefore, have an interest in its continuation. This State-Sardar alliance has also had a negative impact on development and service delivery outcomes.
Secondly, the following policy options need to be considered for diluting the majoritarian federal design. First, the option of introducing a minority veto can be explored. A minority veto would enable parliamentarians from Balochistan to block legislations in Parliament that they deem harmful for the people of the province. Minority veto can take multiple forms and is in place in a number of ethnically-diverse and conflict-affected countries including Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Belgium, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Alternatively, the option of assigning the Senate co-equal powers with the National Assembly in all matters should be considered and the current method of indirect election may be replaced with direct elections. A directly-elected and powerful Senate is likely to incentivise country-wide parties to take serious interest in Balochistan. This will in turn induce more political competition and bring technical expertise and experience to the province. Besides, enhanced powers of the Senate will give smaller provinces like Balochistan more say in decision-making at the federal level.
Furthermore, in order to ensure the effective operationalization of CCI, the position of Deputy Prime Minister can be created with the specific mandate to head the CCI and look after matters specified in Federal Legislative List II.
Thirdly, concrete steps need to be taken to ensure Baloch control over their natural and coastal resources. In this respect:
A statutory commission or authority, like IRSA, may be constituted with the mandate to ensure the effective implementation of Articles 172(3) and 158 of the Constitution. This body should replace the existing Federal Directorate of petroleum and gas. Only the federalization of institutional structures governing oil and gas will ensure provinces their due share in the ownership, management, and revenues of oil and gas resources. Balochistan’s concerns with regard to the pricing, taxation and distribution of its natural gas should be addressed on priority basis.
Ownership of the Saindak copper-gold project should be transferred to the Balochistan government as committed under the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package.
The Reko Diq agreement should be made public. The establishment of a refinery in the province should be ensured. A Chagai foundation with a corporate management and board must be established. At its disposal must be CSR funds, two per cent of the company’s profits, two percent of federal profits and half of the royalty payments to ensure the socioeconomic uplift of the local community. Lastly, a Sovereign Wealth Fund out of the expected revenue inflows from Reko Diq should be created.
As far as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is concerned, Islamabad must adopt a more inclusive development approach prioritizing the basic rights, dignity and development needs of the local people, respecting the marine ecosystem and promoting local livelihoods. Unnecessary check posts must be abolished and drinking water projects should be expedited. A public sector company should be created to harness the potential of desalination and reverse osmosis technology along the coastal belt. Balochistan should be given a share in revenues from the Gwadar port.
Fourthly, well-designed and targeted interventions are needed to alleviate poverty and mitigate the adverse impact of fencing the border on livelihoods.
One of the most important takeaways from the past decades is that the traditional model of growth (i.e. trickle-down economics) and development (i.e. promote human development and livelihoods through public investments in physical and social infrastructure) have failed to achieve the desired results in Balochistan. Although the political and fiscal decentralization introduced by the 18th Amendment has improved local participation in the economic and political sphere, these gains have been undermined by the highly exclusive, and thus fragile, nature of political settlement at the provincial level. High degree of State-led political engineering over the years has facilitated the dominance of the political stage by a group of artificial and more pliant leaders, who are unaccountable to the public at large and use development funds to accumulate wealth, reward their patrons and strengthen clientelistic networks. The cumulative result is that socio-economic outcomes have remained stagnant largely despite massive public spending.
As far as CPEC is concerned, Islamabad must adopt a more inclusive development approach prioritizing the basic rights, dignity and development needs of the local people, respecting the marine ecosystem and promoting local livelihoods.
It is high time to revisit the traditional approach to development in favour of a more targeted and direct approach, consisting predominantly of cash or in-kind transfers to citizens. In this regard, the small population size of the province is good news from the perspective of poverty alleviation and social protection. Nearly 71% of Balochistan’s 1.75 million households live in multi-dimensional poverty. The government should consider providing guaranteed minimum basic income to the entire poor population of the province (1.2 million households approximately). The financial burden would be far less than is usually imagined.
For instance: the estimated cost of extending BISP to the entire poor households of Balochistan is nearly PKR 30 Billion, which is peanuts when compared with the large amount of funds spent by the federal and provincial governments on physical infrastructure and law and order. The law and order expenditures of the provincial government are progressively increasing and currently amount to PkR 60 Billion. Similarly, the development funds allocated informally to MPAs and MNAs by the provincial and federal government exceed PkR 80 Billion. We not only need to streamline and rationalize the chaotic plethora of MPA and MNA schemes but also redirect a portion of these as direct transfers to the people.
A formal border trade gateway with all allied facilities and necessary trade logistics needs to be opened up in each district along Balochistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan. This will promote local livelihoods and boost regional trade.
The writer is a public policy and development professional from Balochistan. He is currently serving as Member (Social Sector & Devolution) at the Planning Commission of Pakistan. He has served in public and international organisations in the UK and Pakistan. He holds two Masters Degrees from the University of Oxford and is a Rhodes Scholar.
