Islamabad – Shafiullah Jan, special assistant to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) chief minister, appeared to refuse to categorically label the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) a “terrorist organization” in an interview with a national news anchor last week – drawing sharp criticism from opponents, activists and media commentators.

At a press appearance this week, federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar played a video clip in which Jan was asked whether the outlawed TTP is a terrorist group. Jan declined to give an unequivocal “yes,” saying “there are groups within the TTP and those who are against the state are terrorists.”

The federal minister seized on the remarks, accusing Jan and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) of soft-pedaling Pakistan’s insurgent threat and extended an “olive branch” to militants.

“The spokespersons of the political party are afraid of talking about the terrorist group,” Tarar said, claiming that PTI leaders fear being attacked by the TTP and therefore won’t condemn them outright.

The comments reignited long-standing debates in Pakistan about counterterrorism, messaging and political strategy — and drawn fire on social media from journalists and activists.

“Inexcusable behavior. You cannot complain or clutch pearls about being smeared as terror sympathizers when your own government’s spokesman can’t muster the bare bones clarity or spine to call the mass murdering butchers of TTP a terrorist group,” wrote activist Ammar Rashid on X.

Raza Haroon, a former provincial minister, wrote: “#PTI appears visibly confused and lacking clarity. Today, the party’s Secretary General, @salmanAraja, categorically acknowledged the #TTP as a terrorist organisation, ironically on the same show..”, adding, “This only exposes the party’s persistent policy incoherence and internal contradictions.”

Some commentators also mentioned older controversies around incarcerated former premier Imran Khan’s statements on militant figures.

In June 2020, Khan drew international and domestic rebuke when he used the Urdu word “shaheed” (martyr) to describe slain Osama bin Laden during a National Assembly speech – language critics said blurred the line between strategic critique of U.S. foreign policy and reverence for a globally designated terrorist.

Opposition leaders at the time said bin Laden was “a terrorist through and through,” pointing to the attacks he orchestrated at home and abroad, including against Pakistani citizens, and questioning the prime minister’s choice of words.

The TTP has been proscribed in Pakistan for years and is widely accused of orchestrating deadly attacks across the country, particularly in the north-west.

Against that backdrop, critics argue that any ambiguity in public rhetoric undermines counterterrorism efforts and emboldens extremist narratives.

Political rhetoric that fails to clearly denounce militant groups like the TTP is problematic because it dilutes public understanding of the threat the group poses and weakens a unified national response to ongoing violence, including numerous recent attacks the TTP has carried out in Pakistan.

Ambiguous language from political figures, especially when they avoid plainly calling an active militant group a terrorist organization, can create confusion among citizens about who is a threat and why, making it harder to sustain broad support for the hard security and legal measures needed to counter the challenge, especially given that there has been a resurgence of the TTP threat recently.

Analysts and security experts have noted that shifting or evasive narratives around the TTP have left the Pakistani public “poorly informed and confused about the nature of the threat,” and have at times emboldened the insurgents by suggesting there might be political space for negotiation without accountability, a distinction crucial for effective counterterrorism policy and public resilience.

This ambiguity also has real implications for national cohesion and counterterror strategy. When elected officials hedge on defining terrorism, it can erode confidence in government commitment to security policy, weaken cross-party cooperation on counterterrorism, and even be exploited by militants in their propaganda, which actively seeks to shape narratives in their favor.

Such rhetoric risks normalizing extremist violence in public discourse and undermines long-standing frameworks like Pakistan’s National Action Plan, which was built on broad consensus to crack down on terrorism and eliminate proscribed organizations.

Fariha Ijaz

The writer is an Assistant Editor at Dissent Today, focusing on extremism and political violence.

The post PTI’s Ambiguous Rhetoric on Taliban Is Dangerous for Pakistan’s Counter-Extremism Efforts appeared first on Dissent Today.

• March 27, 1948, when Pakistan forcibly annexed the Kalat State
• The attack on Khan Kalat’s residence on October 6, 1958, which resulted in his imprisonment
• The hanging of seven Baloch companions of Nawab Nauroz Khan in Hyderabad and Sukkur jails on July 15, 1960, after trials in military courts
• The unconstitutional dismissal of the Ataullah government on February 13, 1973
• The arrest of top Baloch leaders on August 16, 1973
• The wrongful arrest of Baloch leader Khair Bakhsh Marri on January 12, 2000
• The bombardment of Dera Bugti on March 17, 2005
• The brutal killing of former minister Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006
• The assassination of activist Sabeen Mahmud on April 24, 2015, after she hosted a discussion on Balochistan

More recently, the use of water cannons, tear gas, and baton charges against the protesting families of missing persons in Islamabad on December 21, 2023; the shooting of participants in a protest march in Mastung on July 27, 2023; and the brutal attacks on peaceful protesters in Gwadar on July 28-29 have further fueled the grievances of the Baloch people. Additionally, we must remember the names of individuals such as Saba Dashtyari, the victims found in the Tutak mass graves, Comrade Ghulam Mohammad and his friends, Hayat Baloch, and many other Baloch people who lost their lives.

BLA attack and demands for an “apology”

Completely disregarding the history of oppression faced by the Baloch people, Pakistan’s intelligentsia—along with certain segments of civil society—is currently demanding apologies from Dr. Mahrang Baloch, a young woman leading the Baloch struggle against oppression. This demand follows a recent terror attack carried out by Baloch separatists.

On August 25-26, during a well-coordinated attack, the militant group Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeted police stations, railway lines, and highways throughout the province. The assault resulted in the deaths of at least 73 individuals, including 21 militants from the BLA. The separatist group claimed responsibility for the attack on a Frontier Corps camp in Bela, as well as assaults on police stations and Levy posts. Additionally, they detonated a railway bridge in Bolan, blocked roads at several locations across Balochistan, burned vehicles, and forcibly detained individuals at Musakhail, which borders Punjab. The victims were targeted based on their identification cards, which revealed they were from the Punjab province.

The government reported that 21 militants were killed in response to the incident, and some bodies were discovered in Khuzdar and Hub. Several victims were identified by their relatives as missing persons in state custody. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Army Chief General Asim Munir, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi all visited the provincial capital of Quetta to develop a strategy to counter such incidents. The scale, depth, and duration of the BLA attacks not only exposed the government’s security lapses and failures but also highlighted the increased capabilities of militant groups in Balochistan.

Anyone with a basic understanding of what is generally considered ‘common sense’ will recognize that events do not occur in isolation.

‘Do you condemn BLA?’

The way Baloch activists are being pressured to condemn separatists despite them never having supported violence reminds me of a current global event. On October 7 last year, Palestinian fighters from the resistance group Hamas breached the Israeli border and launched attacks on military installations and civilian areas. As a result, Israel experienced between 1,100 and 1,200 fatalities, with numerous individuals taken hostage as the remaining Hamas fighters retreated to Gaza.

The international community expressed shock at the brutality of the attacks. Governments worldwide—including those from developed, developing, and underdeveloped nations, as well as the so-called Muslim Ummah—swiftly condemned Hamas’s actions. There was widespread outrage, with many perceiving the incident as a significant injustice. However, this condemnation of Hamas by the international community has, paradoxically, resulted in escalating acts of violence against Palestinians, which have continued unabated to this day. With few exceptions, the global response has remained largely silent, allowing Israel to kill, injure, starve, displace, and terrorize Palestinians with apparent impunity, based on the belief that Hamas’s actions constituted terrorism—an outrage in its own right.

The atrocities, killings, displacements, and denial of land to the Palestinian people, along with the cultural and economic genocide they have faced since Israel was established in 1948, are often overlooked because Hamas killed 1,100 Israelis. How can the world’s conscience reflect on itself each day and feel content with the deaths of over 40,000 people in Gaza alone since October 7, 2023, disregarding the suffering of Palestinians since 1948?

Throughout this time, those condemning the atrocities in Gaza are being pressured to first denounce Hamas. In a similar manner, following the recent BLA attack in Pakistan, there has been widespread outrage demanding apologies and clarifications from Dr. Mahrang and anyone else with “Baloch” in their name. This expectation for apologies seems reserved for the weaker side, while the powerful conveniently overlook the plight of the victims.

Have any political leaders—Nawaz Sharif, Shehbaz Sharif, Asif Zardari, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, or Imran Khan—ever apologized for the “kill and dump” policy, the Tutak mass graves, the extrajudicial killings, or the regular baton charges against protesting Baloch women who are relatives of missing persons? They are powerful enough to evade accountability. They did not apologize for the atrocities in Bangladesh in 1971, which were conveniently brushed under the carpet in hopes that the world—and most Pakistanis—would soon forget.

How many of those outraged by the attack on August 26 have ever offered a word of condemnation for the killings and abductions of Baloch individuals, even those from universities in Islamabad and Lahore? Why are only the Baloch supposed to condemn violence, while others are exempt from this duty? Why is the killing of certain individuals considered tragic while that of others deemed acceptable?

Are the Baloch students who are taken and held in dungeons for months, only to be released later, considered combatants? Moreover, when they are released, many are left in a vegetative state. A daughter of a missing person who was released after spending time in a dungeon shared with me that she didn’t recognize her father because he appeared to be 75 years old. For quite some time, his mental state resembled that of a child. What pain and trauma do the families of missing individuals endure, and what agony do the families of those released experience upon seeing the condition of their loved ones? Wouldn’t a desire for revenge and a yearning for justice arise in the minds of relatives who suffer so greatly?

The state’s failure

The rulers have attempted to address the Baloch rights issue with force rather than seeking to understand, listen, and engage in dialogue. They had an opportunity to do so when Sardar Ataullah Mengal formed the government in Balochistan in May 1972, but they squandered it by dismissing his government. Although militant groups announced a unilateral ceasefire in September 2008, there was no response, leading them to resume fighting in January 2009. This situation illustrates that Balochistan has been an ongoing tragedy, and the attitude of the rulers suggests that it will continue to be so.

The absurd statement recently made by the Interior Minister, claiming that militancy in Balochistan can be controlled by a Station House Officer (SHO), is not only ludicrous but also reflects the mindset of government officials; he is not alone in holding such views. After the ‘Tandoori Incident’ on May 18, 1973, in which eight Dir Scouts were killed, General Tikka Khan declared in a message to Radio Pakistan that “miscreants would be apprehended in 72 hours.” However, those 72 hours extended into 1977 and beyond. State officials have consistently been out of touch with the realities on the ground in Balochistan.

Neither Hamas’s actions on October 7 nor the BLA’s actions on August 26, 2024, should be viewed in isolation from the larger historical context affecting both groups over the past 75 years. Those leftists who condemn the BLA while supporting Hamas are politically and ideologically inconsistent. The same applies to individuals who regard Kashmiris as freedom fighters while labeling the Baloch as terrorists.

Violence begets violence, and it is never a viable path to resolution. The violence faced by the Baloch has been imposed by the state, and they have responded in kind. Some well-meaning individuals have suggested that the events of August 26 may lead to further repression of the Baloch. However, has life ever been a bed of roses for the Baloch? They have suffered violence as a routine part of their lives for a long time.

The incident on August 26 should serve as an eye-opener for those in charge of this country. First and foremost, they must recognize that this violence stems from the actions they carry out through the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), various agencies, and state-sponsored death squads. Additionally, the significant participation of militants on that day should, upon honest reflection, highlight the level of resentment prevalent in Balochistan. This resentment drives young people to risk their lives and endanger their relatives, particularly since those identified often face ongoing repercussions.

The tragic incident should be considered a lesson rather than a starting point for a new wave of vengeance and violence against the rights and lives of people in Balochistan. Unfortunately, it seems that this lesson is not being learned, as the grim reality of repression continues to surface with the discovery of many missing persons’ bodies in Khuzdar, Bolan, and other areas. Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect Dissent Today’s editorial policy.

Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur

The writer has been associated with the Baloch movement since 1971. He tweets @mmatalpur and can be reached at mmatalpur@gmail.com.

The post Those Demanding Apologies from the Baloch Need a Lesson in History appeared first on Dissent Today.

In June, a sit-in organized  by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) in former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which continued for almost a month, was called off after the government assured that PTM workers, allegedly abducted by security forces, would be released within a week. But the promise remains unfulfilled, and the fate of the victims hangs in the balance. Those at the forefront of this fight against enforced disappearances are met with state’s highhandedness. The arrest of Pashtun MNA Ali Wazir and PTM worker Alamzeb Mehsud further highlights the challenges faced by those advocating for change. The voice of poet Gilamaan Wazir, an active PTM member, was silenced when he was abruptly abducted near Peshawar Airport, and reasons for his abduction remain undisclosed.

Despite Pakistan’s shift from military rule to democratic governance since 2008, the harrowing crime of enforced disappearances continues to plague its citizens. Numerous voices, including political activists, students, parliamentarians, human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers, have passionately raised concerns about this issue. The collective outcry against this grave violation resonates across the country. The halls of High Courts, the chambers of the Supreme Court, and the corridors of the parliament have echoed with the urgency to address this issue, yet, regrettably, the wheels of change seem hesitant to turn. The question that lingers, haunting the conscience of a nation, is why this dark chapter endures despite the clamor for change and the promise of democratic governance.

In June, a sit-in organized  by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) in former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which continued for almost a month, was called off after the government assured that PTM workers, allegedly abducted by security forces, would be released within a week. But the promise remains unfulfilled.

While the issue of enforced disappearances affects the entire nation, it is essential to recognize the concentration of cases in this particular region. The KP region has been a focal point of concern, as it has experienced a discernible surge in instances of enforced disappearances. This trend has prompted us to delve deeper into the underlying factors contributing to this unsettling phenomenon.

Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, FATA remains an area of significant importance. To understand the current situation in these regions, it is crucial to trace back the historical roots that have shaped their governance landscape.

The legacy of European colonialism, with its inherent racial classification of people and territories, established a hegemonic system that enabled the exploitation of nations, marginalized classes, and communities. This hegemony, deeply rooted in the region, has had a lasting impact on the governance structures of KP and Ex-FATA.

The pivotal policy that set the stage for the current state of affairs can be traced back to Lord Curzon’s frontier policy, formulated during the British Raj. Under this policy, the territory previously managed by the Punjab region was deemed to be more effectively governed by the direct control of the government of India. Consequently, the British introduced the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in 1901.

While the FCR laws were lifted from KP in 1956 and from Balochistan in 1973, they remained in effect in FATA until 2018. These regulations, stemming from the colonial era, profoundly impacted the governance of the region. Under the FCR, governance was entrusted to appointed political agents who held substantial powers and authority over the local population.

One of the most egregious aspects of the FCR was the denial of basic rights to individuals. They were not allowed to present evidence or have legal representation in court, rendering them vulnerable to arbitrary decisions. Furthermore, the absence of the right to appeal a conviction in court gave rise to a culture of impunity. The FCR also authorized collective punishment, further violating the fundamental rights and dignity of the people. Additionally, property confiscation added to the oppressive measures imposed upon the population.

After years of struggle and grievance against the heinous colonial-era system, some significant development took place when the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government, in August 2011, made amendments to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). However, a peculiar timeline emerges when we examine the events leading up to this amendment. Just one month prior, in June 2011, the Action in Aid of Civil Power Regulation 2011(AACPR) was implemented, which had been introduced in 2008. It is noteworthy that this regulation was applicable not only in FATA but also in PATA.

The introduction of the AACPR 2011 has been attributed to the military, which has faced criticism for opposing the amendments to the FCR. Amnesty International raised concerns, stating: “the Pakistan army was strongly opposed to these FATA reforms, and they were only approved by the president in August after the armed forces had been given sweeping powers and protections under the AACPR in June of the same year.” These gave military sweeping powers and replaced FCR, despite the elected representatives in the Parliament not being able to play a meaningful role in the affairs of FATA. Unfortunately it does not end here.

Despite the historic and long-awaited amendment passed by the National Assembly in 2018, merging FATA into KP and negating the effects of the FCR, the region still finds itself in the shadows. This amendment aimed to align ex-FATA with the laws and regulations passed by the provincial assembly of KP, operating under the constitution of Pakistan.

While this step was hailed as a positive development, the ground reality has proven to be different. Many common people remain unaware of the changes and the implications they bring. In addition, the matter concerning the regulation of the Action in Aid of Civil Power, which had significant implications for governance and rights, has yet to be adequately debated and addressed.

It did not take long for further complications to arise. The KP Actions (in aid of civil power) Ordinance, 2019, was issued by the provincial governor on August 5. The anticipated positive changes have taken an unexpected turn, as the regulation implemented in 2011, originally applicable only to FATA, has been extended almost identically to encompass the entire Khyber Pashtunkhwa (KP) region. Surprisingly, this ordinance was passed without the knowledge or involvement of the KP assembly.

The present ordinance diverges from the Qanun-i-Shahadat (Evidence Act) by deeming statements from armed forces members as sufficient evidence for convicting individuals, and by permitting the admission of all evidence collected by the internment authority without adhering to standard rules of scrutiny. This ordinance imposes harsh penalties, such as the death penalty, life imprisonment, and fines, for various offenses. Importantly, it denies abducted individuals or those in military custody the legal rights of appeal, access to legal representation, and the right to be heard before a court.

In terms of terminology, the ordinance defines “action in aid of civil power” as measures that involve the mobilization of armed forces to provide support to civil authorities. These measures continue until a written order for withdrawal is issued. The “defined area” refers to the specific region designated by the provincial government where armed forces are requisitioned to secure the territory and maintain peace.

Under this ordinance, provincial governments or their authorized representatives are granted the power to act as the interning authority. This authority allows them to detain individuals, even beyond the defined area. This controversial ordinance was initially declared unconstitutional by the Peshawar High Court but the decision was later suspended by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court formed a three-member bench to hear the petitions filed by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the federal government in relation to the Peshawar High Court’s order. The Supreme Court suspended the High Court’s order until November 15 and announced that a larger bench would be constituted to examine the matter’s constitutionality.

Despite arguments presented in the Supreme Court, the Peshawar High Court declared the ordinance illegal, the controversial ordinance granting power to the military remains in effect. This situation highlights the existence of different laws within the same state, perpetuating the marginalization and continued colonization of these areas. It contradicts the establishment’s own claims that the regions have been cleared and safe for the residents.

Furthermore, the state’s response to peaceful protestors and human rights activists, particularly those associated with the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement advocating for their fundamental rights, has been harsh. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) continue to live in a state of fear. Unfortunately the people of KP find themselves lost in a series of transitions, encompassing the eras of British colonization, dictatorial rule, and democratic shifts. From the oppressive FCR and Shariat systems to subsequent regulations and ordinances, the recent developments have further complicated the situation. In simple words, contrary to expectations, it was not the merger of FATA into KP, but rather KP that was merged into FATA.

Ikram Ullah Maseed

The post Lost in Transition: Enforced Disappearances and the Never-Ending Plight of Ex-FATA appeared first on Dissent Today.

After the attack on the 2014 Army Public School in Peshawar in which the TTP claimed responsibility for killing around 149 people including 132 schoolchildren, he shamelessly sat down with the then PML-N government – though he lacked a shred of regret – and the regime at that time came up with the National Action Plan to deal with terrorism and extremism, but it was never implemented.

Earlier this month, thousands of locals staged a protest sit-in in South Waziristan’s Wana area against the rising terrorism in the tribal areas. Similar anti-Taliban demonstrations have been held in various other parts of KP.

MNA from North Waziristan Mohsin Dawar, the National Democratic Movement (NDM) chief, said in a tweet that the Pashtuns of South Waziristan had come out in large numbers in Wana to protest against terrorism “and Talibanisation in our areas”.

“Our people refuse to be used as cannon fodder and scapegoats in the new great game being imposed on the region,” he added.

Imran Khan, as the chief of the party that rules the province, did not even bother to speak to the protestors. Perhaps he did not wish to anger the TTP, which he has been backing for so many years.

Imran is also responsible for our economic woes. He should have gone to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as soon as he came to power. But being an arrogant egomaniac, he instead relied on overseas Pakistanis and ‘friendly countries’ to make things work.

The Pakistani diaspora sent him a few thousand bucks, and the aid we received from friendly countries was not enough. He eventually did go to the IMF, and after seeing that Pakistan had exhausted all its resources, he inked a loan pact with the country with very harsh conditions. So strict that the PTI government could not implement them.

Imran’s party had around four years to rule compared with the current rulers who have not even completed one full year in power. But Imran Khan still has the gall to blame them for ‘his’ fiscal mess.

Imran is also indirectly responsible for the ongoing flour crisis, as it was his government in Punjab that miscalculated the quantity of wheat that needed to be imported.

Besides, there has been an uptick in extremism and militancy in Punjab ever since the PTI teamed up with the Pakistan Muslim League – Q (PML-Q) to come into power in the province. The recent Taliban attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, the desecration of Ahmadi ‘worship places’ as well as the changes in the words of the nikkahnama to single out the already persecuted community and the incident wherein a fanatic in Narowal confessed to killing a (Muslim) man after accusing him of committing “Shirk” (the sin of idolatry or polytheism) are just a few examples of this growing extremism.

Imran has recently forced the Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa chief ministers to dissolve the provincial assemblies saying that snap polls are an elixir to the financial woes. But if you ask him how, he will be as clueless as he was back in 2008. No plan at all, yet his blind supporters can’t see that. Perhaps, the blame lies with our textbooks that are filled with lies.

Imran is willing to sacrifice Pakistan for the sake of his insatiable ego. He also wanted to return to the National Assembly after making his members resign in the wake of his ouster from power in April last year. However, the NA speaker has accepted the resignations of only 35 PTI MNAs – just about enough to ensure that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif wins the trust vote that Imran was hoping he would take.

To clarify, I am neither a “jiyala, nor a ‘patwari” but a neutral journalist, who writes things as he sees them.

Bilal Farooqi

The writer is a Karachi-based journalist.

The post Imran Khan’s Links To Growing Extremism In Pakistan appeared first on Dissent Today.